

State of the art Morph Detection

SOTAMD



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Outline

- Overview of SOTAMD
- Context
- Importance
- General objectives
- Specific objectives
- Methodology
- Work packages



Overview of SOTAMD

- Qualified for an Action Grant of the European Commission
- Exp. February 2019 February 2020
- Coordinator: National Office for Identity Data, NL
- Partners:
 - Bundeskriminalamt
 - University of Bologna
 - Hochschule Darmstadt
 - The University of Twente
 - Norwegian University of Science and Technology





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Importance

- The scale of the problem is potentially large
- Evaluate possible countermeasures for the vulnerability of current face recognition technology
- Numerous electronic passports potentially vulnerable



Context (1/2)

Research has shown that civil servants:

- are not aware of the possibility that photographs used for the application of identity documents may be morphed
- can easily be deceived by morphed passport photographs and
- would accept them as genuine passport photographs that satisfy the requirements for identity documents.


Also Look-a-like applications were accepted.



Context (2/2)

- Expected rise in passengers
- Deployment of biometric systems
- Vulnerability of biometric systems
- Morphed face image attacks

Number of operational e-Gates in the EU/EEA/CH by year, 2015-[2018] survey results ¹




In morphed face image attacks, biometric samples of multiple subjects (i.e. natural persons) are merged in the signal or feature domain, in order to allow successful verification of all contributing subjects against morphed identity (i.e. the morphed face image).²



General objectives (1/2)

 Focus on automated border control gates, where the bona fide facial image is taken at the border gate. The scenario of differential morph detection, where the bona fide face image is compared, based on their information content, against the printed image in the passport application process.



Differential morphing detection scheme




General objectives (2/2)

- Select Morph Attack Detection mechanisms designed for this specific operational modality and adapt and integrate these mechanisms in a MAD evaluation platform.
- Identify the state-of-the-art MAD mechanisms and analyse their detection accuracy on a sequestered dataset, collected by the participants.



Specific objectives



- At least 2 enrolment images and 2 probe images
- For each face image, 10 similar looking subjects will be selected
- At least 3 algorithms will generate morphed face images
- Automatically and manually postprocessed
- All morphed face images printed and scanned
- At least 3 MAD mechanisms will be prepared
- The MAD mechanisms will be tested
- Accumulate and analyse findings



Methodology

- Independent data acquisition
- Evaluation protocol following ISO/IEC 30107-3
- Open access evaluation platform
 - Bologna benchmarking server
 - following NIST-FRVT-MORPH API
- Image processing pipeline
- Detection Error Trade-off curves (DET)



Work packages

- WP2 Definition of database acquisition protocol and evaluation protocol
- WP3 Database acquisition
- WP4 Detection evaluation
- WP5 Reporting and recommendations



Contact

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